Those who feel censored appeal to legislators, judges, or the court of public opinion. Some claim that they have been denied due process. Others decry monopolization. There are claims of discrimination, or subtle bias, hidden in complex software that is rarely (if ever) analyzed by entities independent of the companies that run it.
1 Consumer protection concerns also arise, for platforms may be marketing themselves as open, comprehensive, and unbiased, when they are in fact closed, partial, and self-serving. 2 To defend themselves, some platforms deploy constitutional arguments against regulation of what they say, which constitutes most of what the firms do. Legal scholars have, in turn, formulated more general theories of corporate speech in industries dependent on models, algorithms, and largely automated arrangements of information.
3 These projects are important and deserve attention from legislators, judges, and regulators. But the pressure to analogize current technologies to past ones in order to apply precedent can occlude the degree to which some new media are fundamentally, qualitatively distinct from past ones. Therefore, theories of the social and political aspects of internet platforms in an era of surveillance capitalism should inform both communications and legal scholarship. 4 Social theory is an especially important aspect of theoretical inquiry in law when, as Julie Cohen notes elsewhere in this volume, extant regulatory models appear increasingly outdated. 5 Social theory can also guide regulators as they resolve (or render irrelevant) a basic tension that has vexed communications law: whether internet platforms are better characterized as enablers of communication (conduits), or as embodying content itself. In the United States, judicial sympathy toward the idea of corporate rights has led to decisions affirming for-profit platforms' selection and arrangement of information as not merely copyrightable, but also a form of free speech. 6 In Europe, free expression rights have been better cabined to speech by individual human beings, rather than "corporate persons" or software. 7 This basic divergence in values helps explain a number of policy differences between the United States and the European Union, in areas ranging from privacy to antitrust to industrial policy. The U.S. approach is at its core neoliberal, premised on accelerating capital acquisition by asymmetrically disabling some forms of state power (such as consumer protection) and entrenching others (such as the protection of corporate trade secrets). As befits a more mixed economy, the EU approach is nuanced and variegated. But neither rests on a broader normative theory of what a well-ordered digital sphere of freedom of expression would look like.
This Article aims to clear some ground to enable the development of such a theory, by examining the relationship between free expression and regulation on the internet. Many attorneys believe there is a tension between regulation and free expression. But in fact, when antitrust or competition law, consumer protection regulation, and privacy protections apply to very large internet platforms, they are as apt to promote freedom of expression as to limit it. Such laws are critical tools to ensure "platform neutrality," a principle whose flexibility matches the protean nature of today's online environment. The core idea of neutrality is to prevent massive intermediaries from distorting either private commerce or the public sphere simply by virtue of their size, network power, or surveillance capacities. As the French Conseil National du Numerique has observed, " [t] he goals behind the neutrality principle should . . . be factored into the development of digital platforms: while extremely useful and innovative, their growth must not be allowed to hamper the use of Internet as a forum for creation, free expression and the exchange of ideas." It is wrong to treat massive internet intermediaries as vulnerable media always in danger of being suborned by the state, as Part I shows. Viewing intermediaries as digital utilities opens up new opportunities for regulation in the public interest, as Part II shows. This regulation may crimp the "free expression" of "corporate persons," but is necessary for fair opportunities at expression (or even understanding of the social world) by human persons generally. The Article concludes with reflections on how platform neutrality can inform future regulatory initiatives directed toward new media.
I. content or conduIt: IntermedIarIes' convenIent IdentIty crIsIs
Telecommunications infrastructure has enabled enormous advances in expression. 10 The critical free expression at stake in governmental regulation of such services is that of their users, rather than that of the platforms themselves.
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This emphasis prevents carriers from, say, deploying opportunistic assertions of free expression protections to justify denials of service to businesses and persons of whom they disapprove. It also helps immunize carriers from responsibility for what customers say while using their services. 12 The phone company can affirmation of regulation of radio stations. 19 In Red Lion, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the FCC's decision to require broadcasters to grant political candidates they criticized some "right of reply." This "fairness doctrine" was meant to assure that the power of broadcasters would be exercised in the public interest, rather than simply reflect the political views of their owners. The Court permitted this regulation of the airwaves in Red Lion, by reasoning that broadcasters deserve less protection because of the scarcity of channels, and a history of governmental regulation in the area. Of course, the "history of regulation" rationale begs the question of why the FCC was allowed to regulate the airwaves in the first place. A more plausible approach focuses on the pervasiveness and scarcity of the media involved. Newspapers generally were delivered only to paid subscribers, and anyone (with enough money) could start one. 20 Television and radio stations broadcast indiscriminately (within their range), and had to be licensed by the FCC.
Internet Those factors are not present in cyberspace. Neither before nor after the enactment of the CDA have the vast democratic forums of the Internet been subject to the type of government supervision and regulation that has attended the broadcast industry. Moreover, the Internet is not as "invasive" as radio or television.
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Even at the time Reno was decided, Justices O'Connor and Rehnquist worried about its continuing relevance. In a separate opinion (concurring in part and dissenting in part), they urged Congress to consider future lawmaking premised on new technological development that could more effectively "zone" parts of the internet for children only. 25 Fortunately, the Reno case can be read as only applying to regulation targeting the internet as a whole, and not necessarily as an all-purpose quashing of any effort to qualify the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to important firms or sectors within the internet. The internet in general may "provide relatively unlimited, low-cost capacity for communication of all kinds," 26 but the dominant search engines and social networks within it meticulously exercise control over search results and newsfeeds. Moreover, the Reno case even appears dated in the context of broadband internet access. In the early 2000s, the FCC voted to largely deregulate internet services, reasoning that a relatively competitive market in access would discipline carriers and give users ample opportunities to switch to congenial networks.
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But by 2012, a decade of evidence demonstrated the opposite: both fixed and mobile broadband services were subject to significant concentration and indifference to important consumer and public concerns. 28 24 Id. at 868-69. 25 A similar concern arises today in the context of French authorities' efforts to apply the "right to be forgotten" to Google sites accessed in France (such as Google. com), rather than simply to the site operated by Google's French subsidiary (Google.fr). Google characterizes the efforts as a form of censorship that would allow one country to dictate to the world its views on the permissibility of publishing certain links in response to certain name-based queries. However, geo-blocking could address the issue by applying the decision to sites accessed in France, rather than simply applying it to Google.fr (a "remedy" that simply invites widespread usage of the Google.com site Reno was a double victory for internet firms. While striking down the anti-indecency provisions of the CDA, the Court let stand its Section 230, a veritable Magna Carta of corporate impunity with respect to causes of action like defamation, privacy violations, and business torts. 29 The year after the CDA passed, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) of 1998 30 afforded immunities to intermediaries for intellectual property infringement enabled by their networks. As long as they operated "notice and takedown" procedures to respond to complaints of intellectual property infringement via uploads or links provided by their sites, they could avoid liability.
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Not all countries have laws like the CDA and DMCA. 32 Nevertheless, in the many forums that have tried to call Google, Facebook, Amazon, and other firms to account, a fundamentally American-exceptionalist legal logic based on the two laws has informed these leading internet intermediaries' efforts to deflect liability. When intellectual property or defamation claims arise, they emphasize their role as mere conduits, reflecting the preferences and serving the interests of users. But when classic business tort or privacy claims arise, intermediaries argue that they are speakers, their selection and arrangement of information a type of activity best protected as freedom of expression. 33 Thus, Google has shifted its self-characterization as content-provider or conduit opportunistically.
34 For example, due to a number of anti-Semites' efforts to manipulate search rankings, a Holocaust denial site routinely appeared in the top ten results for the query "Jew." 35 In response to complaints from the Anti-Defamation League, Google added a headline titled, "An explanation of our search results" to the top of the page. 36 The linked webpage explained the reasons why the anti-Semitic site appeared so high in the relevant rankings and distanced Google from the results. 37 During this controversy, and in many subsequent instances, Google presented itself as little more than a cultural voting booth, a transmitter of popular preference as processed through algorithms with no obligation to reflect social values. Just as the U.S. Supreme Court has frequently protected repulsive and offensive speech as the "price" of a neutrally, objectively applied First Amendment, Google claimed that it must accept that an anti-Semitic site could rise to the top of search results on the basis of neutral signals used to rank sites generally. But in many other disputes, Google claims an absolute right to knock any site off any search result page it generates.
38 That is the natural, if ironic, logic of its "free speech" case against antitrust liability for favoring its own services and demoting competitors in search results.
39 Note that such a "free expression" rationale would not simply
Or is Google search a publisher, like a newspaper, which provides only the information that it sees fit and is protected by the First Amendment?"). allow Google to decide, say, how to present results for political candidates or culturally sensitive issues. 40 Rather, its extraordinary over-inclusiveness would also privilege the firm's ability to hide results leading to startups founded by its ex-employees, or rival firms.
Large technology platforms' strategic, opportunistic, and contradictory self-characterizations take advantage of the siloed nature of legal disputes. Specialization obscures the big picture as individual disputes come to judges and regulators prepackaged as "free expression," "intellectual property," or "privacy" disputes. Cyberlaw scholars can unintentionally contribute to the extraordinary power of internet firms by adopting a similar logic of specialization, and losing sight of the larger picture. Google, for instance, has won key cases in copyright, trademark, and antitrust; key immunities in the context of free expression defenses; and has avoided classification as a "consumer reporting agency" under the Fair Credit Reporting Act. 41 Any particular outcome may well have been advisable as a matter of law and/or policy, considered alone. But what happens when a critical mass of close cases combines with network effects to give a few firms extraordinary power over our information about (and even interpretation of) events? A legal system incapable of answering (or even contemplating) such a question has little chance of constructively channeling the development of new technologies. 42 These opportunistic shifts in self-characterization have also made U.S. internet intermediary law a major barrier to accountability online, and threaten to put intermediaries above the law globally in an era of domestic-lawdisplacing trade agreements. 43 Following recent work connecting the transfer pricing of intellectual property (where firms have incentives to minimize the value of their IP) to damages claims in IP litigation (where the incentives are to maximize valuation), 44 policymakers could refuse to allow intermediaries to have it both ways, forcing them to assume the rights and responsibilities of content-provider or conduit. Such a development would be fairer than current trends, which allow many intermediaries to enjoy the rights of each and responsibilities of neither.
II. How regulatIon can Promote sPeecH onlIne
Online platforms often characterize their own selection and arrangement of materials, and assistance in helping others' search for materials of interest, as a form of speech. However tempting the metaphor of "search as speech" may be, courts must avoid forcing a vast, sprawling array of human activities into a Procrustean bed of "speech." Otherwise, worthwhile initiatives for reform may be snuffed out before they can even be tried.
A. Must-Carry Rules
Consider, for instance, Canadian legal scholar Jennifer Chandler's proposed idea of a "right to reach an audience" through dominant search engines. 45 She has argued that the search engine has an obligation, thanks to its dominant position and storage capacities, to index all sites publicly available on the web. 46 Chandler's idea looks backwards (at precedents like "must-carry" In a series of copyright disputes, Google had argued that it should receive a special dispensation from intellectual property laws so that it could provide and archive, backup copy, and index the web and the world's books. Mary rules for cable networks) and could be carried forwards: from a minimalist aspect of net neutrality, to a minor "indexing duty" as an aspect of search neutrality, to an aspect of app neutrality. 47 A presumption of inclusion for those running the app stores and software for dominant phones, like Apple (or GooglePlay, which services Android Phones), could provide a level playing field for unpopular or unprofitable speech while barely affecting the functioning of large platforms.
For deregulationist digerati, the idea of pushing neutrality beyond the "pipes" of the internet, to hardware, critical software, dominant search engines, social networks, and apps, may seem like an impulse for fairness run amok. However, networked technology is often more prone to concentrate power than it is to diffuse it, and when such concentrations of power occur, law must respond to them. 48 Consider the rise of "WeChat" in China, on a "one app to rule them all" model. 49 It is primarily a messaging and chat app. 51 To the extent that it attracts a massive user base to become a dominant intermediary in varied areas of content and commerce, it should attract the same scrutiny originally aimed at intermediaries in movements for net and search neutrality. And even in the very narrow field of "doctor search," rules are common and largely commendable.
Chan calls
WeChat a "kingmaker" for both content and commerceexactly the characterization Alexander Halavais chose for Google in his prescient work Search Engine Society in 2008.
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The fact that a consumer could, in principle, search for doctors or restaurants in either WeChat or Google or their insurer's website, may seem to diminish the importance of rules of fair treatment binding on any particular platform. But in an age of social acceleration, most users are either not inclined (or lack the time) to make a leisurely choice of what app or search engine (or other intermediary) will best guide them toward what they want. 53 Leading platforms reign, and tip into dominance at very rapid speed.
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Platforms may protest, claiming that they should be treated no differently than a "brick-and-mortar" retailer like Wal-Mart. Few advocate that it be required to stock certain volumes of books, or products. But this misunderstands the difference between digital and physical sales. Executives who brag to 51 shareholders about a "long tail" of endlessly diverse online content can't turn around and tell governmental authorities that they must jealously guard limited space. 55 For the largest internet-based companies, an app will take up a tiny fraction of their overall storage and communications capacity. To the extent that the cost is nontrivial, it can be shifted to the app demanding inclusion (plus a reasonable rate of return for the dominant app seller to compensate for the inconvenience). To make the internet a level playing field, dominant companies need to start recognizing the utility-like aspects of their role, and to shoulder some burdens (rather than just pocketing the benefits) of serving as an infrastructure of free expression. 56 The "long tail" aspect of digital megaplatforms neatly reverses the classic "abundance" rationale for deregulation. In communications law 1.0, agencies invoked "spectrum scarcity" to justify interventions designed to bring some order to, say, the airwaves. 57 As options like cable and the internet developed, a neoliberal reaction questioned the necessity of must-carry rules and the fairness doctrine. Media options seemed endless, so why try to make any particular one fair or balanced? 58 In the second decade of the new millennium, advancing computing capacity (and, more importantly, its social organization) has changed the landscape again. A sense of near-infinite plenitude inheres not merely in the internet as a whole, but also in the web giants constantly investing in the computing capacity needed to map large portions of it. When a service has hundreds of millions of users, the acceptance of certain rules for it starts to seem less 55 Must-carry rules in this context are two removes from censorship as traditionally conceived. First, they are only adding information to a search platform: they are pro-speech. Adding one option does not automatically push out others. Second, they amount to an effort by one kind of sovereign to limit the power of another to censor. As Jeffrey Rosen observes:
Until recently, the person who had more power to determine who may speak and who may be heard around the world was not a president or king or Supreme Court Justice. She was Nicole Wong, who was deputy general counsel at Google until her recent resignation. might be conditioned on platforms adopting internal processes designed to give those entirely de-indexed some right to a fair hearing and explanation for the action. 64 The critical point is to recognize the malleability of the new information infrastructure.
Admittedly, Google has won some lawsuits challenging its placement of websites in search results on free expression grounds. In Langdon v. Google, 65 Langdon claimed that Google had a duty to carry his advertisements, which charged U.S. bureaucrats with corruption and China with committing atrocities. 66 The district court dismissed the claim. 67 For the Langdon court, Google's advertising decisions were tantamount to those made by a newspaper, and therefore regulation of them would be as suspect as the "right of reply" at issue (and rejected) Google is a dominant search engine not only in the United States but in much of Europe and beyond, and plays a critical role for the inquisitive. To the extent that it is a media entity, it is closer to the situation of the firms in Red Lion and Turner than it is to the Miami Herald. 70 Its reach is far larger than that of the newspaper in Miami Herald. Its selection and arrangement of links comes far closer to the cable network or broadcaster's decision about what shows to program (where such entities, by and large, do not create the content they choose to air), than it does to a newspaper which mostly runs its own content and has cultivated an editorial voice (ala the Miami Herald). Finally, and most importantly, massive internet platforms must take the bitter with the sweet: if they want to continue avoiding liability for intellectual property infringement and defamation, they should welcome categorization as a conduit for speech, rather than speaker status itself.
B. Antitrust and Competition Law
Google is no stranger to competition regulation. One commentator has estimated that the company "officially violated antitrust laws in 10 different ways over 5 years." 71 The company's critics routinely critique its practices as anticompetitive. 72 As of January 2012, it was under investigation in nine countries, the European Union, and some states in the United States. 73 But in early January 2013, Google scored a major victory, as the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) agreed to drop nearly all of the most publicized part of its case against the company: allegations of biased and anticompetitive behavior in search results. Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch worried that Google may have been "telling 'half-truths' -for example, that its gathering of information about the characteristics of a consumer is done solely for the consumer's benefit, instead of also to maintain a monopoly or near-monopoly position." 74 But the majority of the Commission decided unequivocally to end the investigation. They publicly justified the decision with little more than a page of assurances that FTC interviews and economic analyses had found little to no problematic behavior.
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Unmentioned in the decision, but perhaps influencing the result, was Google's would-be "trump card" argument against intervention: a constitutional claim that the First Amendment effectively foreclosed any robust remedies, such as requirements that Google alter search results to include links to competitors of its varied conglomeratized holdings. A Google filing written by Eugene Volokh and Donald Falk 76 has made the "free expression" case for virtually unfettered discretion in the exercise of internet intermediaries' editorial judgment. The stakes of the legal strategy are high. If Google succeeds, just about any information age company 77 could characterize its selection and coordination of information as "searchy" and thus "speechy" enough to avoid regulation. 78 Fortunately, neither courts nor regulators must accept a general theory of search as speech. It is an effort to impose a "one-size-fits-all" approach on multifarious phenomena. 79 There is no generalized "free expression" exemption from competition laws for communication conduits or media firms -and to the extent that search engines mix both functions, they have never given an account of why that mixing should lead to even more protection from regulation than was enjoyed by the entities whose functions they meld. Indeed, there is a strong case for more regulation and watchdogging, since the vertical integration of content and conduit (along with horizontal conglomeratization accelerated by winner-take-all dynamics online) tends toward the creation of ever more powerful firms. the contrary. . . . Surely a command that the government itself shall not impede the free flow of ideas does not afford non-governmental combinations a refuge if they impose restraints upon that constitutionally guaranteed freedom. . . . Freedom to publish is guaranteed by the Constitution, but freedom to combine to keep others from publishing is not. . . . The First Amendment affords not the slightest support for the contention that a combination to restrain trade in news and views has any constitutional immunity. 82 Admittedly, in the U.S. context, the First Amendment is often seen as a protection only from government action, not private initiative. But even U.S. courts are under no obligation to blind themselves to their First Amendment interpretations' effects on the general information environment. Virtually any government regulation will have direct or incidental impact on some entity's ability to "speak," and the determination of the line between proper and improper regulations, when regulations are challenged on free expression grounds, should depend not merely on the interests of the party bringing the suit, but on mature consideration of the general effects of the regulation.
Moreover, even some U.S. case law affirms a positive right to governmental intervention against the speech-constraining activity of private parties. U.S. courts have consistently held that, "when a crowd or individual threatens hostile action in response to a demonstration or speaker," the First Amendment "grants a positive right to the speaker: the local government must take action to protect the speaker against a hostile crowd. The courts do not allow local law enforcement to accede to a heckler's veto."
83 Though U.S. courts have historically been extraordinarily suspicious towards positive rights framings of constitutional issues, the clash of private rights so evident in communicative contexts has forced them to recognize the importance of positive state action to promote truly free expression. This recognition should extend to digital contexts. For example, consider the possibility that massive internet platforms might secretly bias their news coverage in an election to promote one favored candidate. Successful legal action to require the disclosure of this pattern of behavior, as an unfair and deceptive trade practice, would improve the public sphere, not diminish it. Those who promote "more speech" as the solution to problems of media or intermediary bias in the democratic public sphere should welcome such disclosure requirements. Both hostile crowds and monopolizing corporations can suppress speech. Laws guaranteeing public order respond to the first threat; competition law can address the second. For example, in Lorain Journal v. United States, a newspaper refused to deal with advertisers who advertised on its new competitor, a radio station. 85 The newspaper claimed that it had an unfettered right to choose its advertisers, but the Court disagreed. If business enterprises can get their core message across while respecting the intellectual property laws, so too should they be able to adequately communicate without trampling on the Sherman Act. 86 The applicability of competition law to search engines should be even clearer than its applicability to pure media firms. There is a spectrum of plausibly "message-sending" entities; consider the range of messages plausibly "expressed" by each "author" in the following chart. Were a government to require newspaper articles to express a particular point of view, that would be a violation of freedom of expression. Prohibiting one firm from owning more than thirty percent of newspaper chains or cable networks, though, has far less dire consequences for freedom of expression -and may well promote it. Similarly, basic rules about what advertisements a media firm must carry do not infringe on its primary function of delivering content. Note, too, that the chart above only covers the content and corporate organization of entities already recognized as media. To the extent dominant search engines, social networks, and other new media simply enable connections The publisher claims a right as a private business concern to select its customers and to refuse to accept advertisement from whomever it pleases. . . . [But the] right claimed by the publisher is neither absolute nor exempt from regulation. Its exercise as a purposeful means of monopolizing interstate commerce is prohibited by the Sherman Act. 86 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
Comparing the Expressiveness of Media and Corporations
between audiences and content, they fall even further on the "less expressive" side of the spectrum schematized above.
Governments will continue to grapple with the free expression implications of ordering certain results to be included or excluded in search engine results pages. As they do so, they should remember that search engines, most of the time, share more in common with carriers and conduits than they do with media firms.
87 Moreover, to the extent that the media analogy is appropriate, it is not dispositive, as Turner Broadcasting learned in the context of its illfated facial challenge to "must-carry" regulations, and the Lorain Journal and Associated Press learned in the competition law context.
C. Privacy Laws
Once upon a time, it was plausible to strictly distinguish between information collection by private firms, and that done by the government. Libertarians in particular expressed deep suspicion of the latter, and tended to view the former as a form of free inquiry, deserving whatever constitutional protections are afforded to speech by human persons. However, scholars have shown that the government often uses private databases to gather data it is itself forbidden from collecting. 88 After the Snowden revelations of pervasive government hacking of (or collaboration with) massive technology firms, the stakes of so-called "private" information gathering are even clearer. There is no clear line between corporate and governmental data gathering.
The Snowden revelations also suggested another complication of longstanding theoretical assumptions about the divide between public and private. Certain parts of the state, such as the Commission Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libertés (CNIL) in France or FTC in the United States, can stop or limit data acquisition and transfer. Others, primarily in the security and intelligence sectors, urge the expansion and intensification of surveillance. One major reason persons fail to speak out or protest is because they are afraid of their words coming back to haunt them. 89 This fear is not unfounded: recent surveillance abuses have uncovered frequent government monitoring of core political communication. 90 Therefore, some quantum of privacy is a sine qua non of free expression rights worth having. The instrumentalities of the state that guarantee such privacy are part of the infrastructure of free expression. The "private" firms that defy or evade those guardians of privacy are just as surely undermining the infrastructure of free expression as the surveillance state that has monitored, and will continue to monitor, the data gathered by private firms.
91
The integration of state and private surveillance has cast Eugene Volokh's effort to characterize privacy protections as the "troubling right to stop others from speaking about you" in a new light. 92 Given the rising power of algorithmic classifications based on big data, predictive analytics, and machine learning programs seamlessly integrating corporate and state information, threats to personal reputation or liberty appear less as speech than as menacing classifications. "Relational surveillance," based not only on state-gathered data but also the observations of a private apparatus far more invasive and intrusive, may run afoul not merely of the Fourth Amendment, but also of the First Amendment. 93 To the extent that privacy laws require data deletion or compartmentalization that frustrates such surveillance, they are likely to do as much to support fundamental values of free expression of persons, as they are to undermine the rights of corporations as researchers or archivists of data.
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Individuals' ability to learn more about the world is also enabled by targeted restrictions on the collection and sharing of information by large firms. A person might hesitate to join a mental illness support group on Facebook, once she is aware that a data miner might later use the data generated by that membership in myriad, unforeseeable contexts. State restrictions on the sale of such data enable her rights of free association and inquiry, even if they come at the expense of asserted corporate prerogatives to perfectly "know" potential customers, and speak about and to them. Rather than framing the issue as one of privacy versus free expression, it is more proper to see this as a dispute over rival claims of free expression -where privacy interests weigh heavily on one side.
The technological tools for matching digital records are staggering. State restrictions on the use of that data (or other forms of tracking) can be an important step toward giving individuals a chance to form and express opinions and affiliations in peace -without fearing an endlessly ramifying series of classifications made and opportunities possibly denied, on account of faceless and secretive data miners. One legal expert recently warned that employers "may develop complex scoring algorithms based on electronic health records to determine which individuals are likely to be high-risk and high-cost workers." 95 surveillance and suggests how these guarantees might apply to particular forms of analysis of traffic data. At a 2012 Diane von Furstenburg fashion show, models wore "Google Glasses" as they walked down the runway, filming the audience that observed them.
The glasses contained not only a tiny camera, but also a screen that could project information for their wearers, like a crawl at the bottom of a cable news program. Synced to face-recognition technology, the glasses might give details on the name, profession, awards, net worth, and criminal record of any face in the crowd. The "faceprint" is the new fingerprint. The "augmented reality" devices promised to make their wearers "laser focused, walking encyclopedias." 97 Media outlets lapped up the story, titillated by yet another facet of science fiction about to become commercial fact.
Far less salient in their eyes were the concerns raised by a 2005 honors thesis, Through the Google Goggles: Sociopolitical Bias in Search Engine Design, by Alejandro M. Diaz. 98 Diaz described how "designs for search technologies encode certain values about what sort of content is 'important,' 'relevant,' or 'authoritative,'" and chronicled case after case where Google's decisions implicated such values. Even as early as 1999, a growing literature was questioning the political and ethical values underlying the search systems that were then beginning to make sense of the internet. Diaz's evocative metaphor, "Google Goggles," suggests that the firm's glasses, like its search engines, may not only "augment" reality, but also distort it, bias it, render it in certain preapproved corporate directions, and blind users to more critical takes. When massive platforms combine the functions of conduits, content providers, and data brokers, analogies from old free expression cases quickly fall apart. Too many discussions of the expressive dimensions of new media are nevertheless moored in murky doctrinal categories, reifications, and inapt historical analogies that do more to obscure than reveal the true stakes of disputes. It is time to think beyond the old categories and to develop a new way of balancing dominant platforms' rights and responsibilities. Sometimes, that will require the translation of old principles of media regulation (like rules against stealth marketing) to new contexts. In other cases, litigation will be needed to stop dominant platforms from abusing their power online. Platforms should also acknowledge their de facto role as public forums and quasi-judicial law interpreters, even if they resist taking on all the de jure responsibilities such roles imply for state actors.
Unfortunately, the frequent invocation of "free expression" now appears to be little more than a facet of Silicon Valley public relations. 99 Companies like Twitter and Facebook are quick to take the credit when their platforms are part of movements, but trivialize user rights in their own governance. It is almost as if the platforms see themselves as virtual worlds, whose users have essentially accepted (via terms of service) near-absolute sovereignty of corporate rulers.
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At their best, platforms recognize that such sovereignty comes with responsibilities as well as rights. The power to rank is the power to make certain public impressions permanent, and others fleeting. As platforms gain commercial, political, and cultural influence, their "often opaque technology 99 kaTherine losse, The Boy kings: a Journey inTo The hearT oF The social neTwork (2012). 100 James Grimmelmann, Virtual World Feudalism, 118 yale l.J. PockeT ParT 126, 128 (2009) (arguing that in the digital feudalism of virtual worlds, the software developer "is both the grantor who makes the grant and the law which protects it") (quoting s.F.c. milsom, hisTorical FoundaTions oF The common law 104 (1st ed. 1969)).
of ranking becomes kingmaker in new venues." 101 The question now is whether the state (and companies themselves) will make these processes more comprehensible, fair, transparent, and open to critical analysis by the publics they affect.
